The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) today approved a wide-ranging draft resolution, entitled “Steps to building a common road map towards a world without nuclear weapons”, which drew extensive debate and 18 separate recorded votes for approval.
Introduced by Japan and co-sponsored by the United States, the text (document A/C.1/77/L.61) would have the General Assembly urge all States to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again and to uphold the principles of irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency in relation to their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Moreover, it would urge those States to sign and ratify Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Also, among its many provision, the Assembly would call on the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices.
The draft resolution was approved by a recorded vote of 139 in favour to 6 against (China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, South Africa, Syria), with 31 abstentions. Prior to approval of the text as a whole, separate recorded votes were required on eight preambular paragraphs and nine operative paragraphs.
By a recorded vote of 120 in favour to 3 against (India, Pakistan, South Africa), with 27 abstentions, the Committee retained preambular paragraph 3, by which the Assembly would reaffirm the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and an important element in facilitating the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as its determination to implement the Treaty in full, including its article VI, and to further enhance its universality.
The Committee retained preambular paragraph 5 by which the Assembly would express regret over the decision of one State to block a consensus outcome at the tenth NPT Review Conference in August. The vote was 96 in favour to 5 against (China, Cuba, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, South Africa), with 51 abstentions.
By a recorded vote of 122 in favour to 4 against (Nicaragua, Russian Federation, South Africa, Syria), with 28 abstentions, it retained preambular paragraph 6, by which the Assembly would express deep concern at the deteriorated international security environment, including in Ukraine, and that the threat of nuclear weapon use is higher than in the cold war. It would note the non-nuclear-weapons States’ concern about the qualitative improvement of nuclear forces by some nuclear-weapon States.
The Assembly would reaffirm its support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in retaining preambular paragraph 10 by a recorded vote of 145 in favour to 1 against (Israel), with 6 abstentions (Equatorial Guinea, India, Iran, Myanmar, Namibia, Syria).
By a recorded vote of 111 in favour to 6 against (Austria, Egypt, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, South Africa) with 35 abstentions, it retained preambular paragraph 11, by which the Assembly would emphasize the importance for all States of taking further practical steps and effective measures towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, based on the principle of undiminished and increased security for all.
A recorded vote of 136 in favour to 3 against (China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Russian Federation), with 13 abstentions, preambular paragraph 13 was approved, by which the Assembly would reiterate deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and reaffirm that this awareness ought to underpin the approaches and efforts towards nuclear disarmament, and welcome visits of leaders, youth and others to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The Committee, by a recorded vote of 138 in favour to 1 against (Russian Federation), with 14 abstentions, approved preambular paragraph 14, by which the Assembly would acknowledge that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted on 7 July 2021 and entered into force on 22 January 2021.
By 154 in favour to 2 against (Iran, Russian Federation), with 2 abstentions (Equatorial Guinea, Senegal), it kept preambular paragraph 16, by which the Assembly would reaffirm the importance to ensure equal, full, and effective participation and leadership of both women and men, and to further integrate a gender perspective in all aspects of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation decision-making processes.
Turning to operative paragraph 1, the Committee retained it by a recorded vote of 133 in favour to 1 against (Egypt), with 22 abstentions. By its terms, the Assembly would urge all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to ensure nuclear weapons are never used again, pending their total elimination, and to refrain from any inflammatory rhetoric concerning their use.
A recorded vote of 103 in favour to 15 against, with 39 abstentions held preambular paragraph 2, by which the Assembly would call on the nuclear-weapon States to honour and respect existing security assurances and to not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT.
Operative paragraph 3 of “L.31”, approved by a recorded vote of 143 in favour to 2 against (China, Russian Federation), with 11 abstentions, would have the Assembly call on States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency in relation to their NPT obligations and to pursue enhanced transparency measures without prejudice to their national security.
Operative paragraph 4 held by a recorded vote of 127 in favour to none against, with 30 abstentions. According to it, the Assembly would emphasize that maintaining the overall decreasing trend of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons is vital in getting closer to a world free of nuclear weapons. It would call on nuclear-weapon States to undertake further efforts to reduce and eliminate all types of nuclear weapons.
By a recorded vote of 151 in favour to 2 against (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, India), with 6 abstentions (Bhutan, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia), it approved operative paragraph 5, by which the Assembly would urge all States to sign and ratify the CTBT, and pending its entry into force, refrain from nuclear-weapon-test explosions and any other action that would defeat the Treaty’s purpose, and declare a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions.
Operative paragraph 6 held by a recorded vote of 135 in favour to 4 against (China, Iran, Pakistan, Russian Federation), with 15 abstentions, by which the Assembly would call on the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material, as well as on the nuclear-weapon States to declare or maintain voluntary moratoriums.
A recorded vote of 136 in favour to 2 against (South Africa, Jamaica), with 21 abstentions, retained the operative paragraph 7, by which the Assembly would call on States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to commit to effective risk reduction measures to mitigate risks arising from miscalculation or miscommunication, and to maintain the practice of not targeting each other or any other State with nuclear weapons and to keep them at the lowest possible alert level.
The Assembly would underscore the importance of complying with the non-proliferation obligations to uphold the NPT’s integrity and the authority of the safeguards system, under operative paragraph 9, which was retained by a recorded vote of 129 in favour to 2 against (Iran, South Africa), with 26 abstentions.
Finally, by a recorded vote of 132 in favour to 4 against (China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Syria), with 22 abstentions, the Committee approved operative paragraph 10, by which the Assembly would reaffirm the commitment to achieve the complete dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and programmes, as well as other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic-missile programmes, of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and note with serious concern that country’s new law lowering the threshold for nuclear-weapon use, and urge it to comply with the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
Next, the Committee took up a draft decision, entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” (document A/C.1/77/L.65). It was introduced by Egypt on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition. According to the text, the Assembly would include the item as a subitem under General and Complete Disarmament in its next session. The text was approved by a recorded vote of 154 in favour to 3 against (India, Israel, Russian Federation), with 23 abstentions.
The Committee then approved a draft decision, entitled “Nuclear-weapon-free Southern hemisphere and adjacent areas” (document A/C.1/77/L.72), introduced by Brazil, by which the Assembly would include on its next agenda a subitem by the same name. The Committee approved the decision by a recorded vote of 160 in favour to 1 against (Russian Federation), with 18 abstentions.
Speaking in explanation of vote after the vote on nuclear weapons were representatives of the Philippines, Austria, Ghana, Czech Republic, Netherlands, New Zealand, Brazil, Algeria, Pakistan, Israel, Mexico, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Singapore, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Switzerland, Republic of Korea, India, Russian Federation, Indonesia, United States, Spain, Argentina, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Japan, Columbia, Djibouti, France, Egypt and Kiribati.
Speaking in exercise of the right of reply on nuclear weapons were representatives of the Russian Federation, Japan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
The Committee opened for action its cluster on other weapons of mass destruction, for which general statements were made by representatives of Poland and France.
The First Committee will meet again at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, 1 November, to continue taking action on all draft resolutions and decisions before it.
Action on Nuclear Weapons
When the Committee Chair resumed the twenty-fifth plenary meeting suspended Friday evening, the representative of Costa Rica, on a point of order, asked for respect for the translation of the meetings in their entirety, should they go past the allotted time, in the six official language of the United Nations.
The Committee then turned to the consideration of the draft resolution, tabled by Japan, entitled “Steps to building a common road map towards a world without nuclear weapons” (document A/C.1/77/L.61) and proceeded to take action on eight preambular paragraphs and nine operative paragraphs.
Among its provisions, the General Assembly would urge all States, especially nuclear-weapon States, to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again and to refrain from any inflammatory rhetoric. It would call on those States, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to honour security assurances not to use or threaten to use those weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and to uphold the principles of irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency in relation to their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Moreover, it would urge all States to sign and ratify Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and, pending its entry into force, refrain from any action that would defeat the Treaty’s purpose. It would call on the Conference of Disarmament to start negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material.
By a recorded vote of 120 in favour to 3 against (India, Pakistan, South Africa), with 27 abstentions, the Committee retained preambular paragraph 3, by which the Assembly would reaffirm the NPT as cornerstone of the global nuclear proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and its determination to implement the Treaty in full.
By a recorded vote of 96 in favour to 5 against (China, Cuba, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, South Africa), with 51 abstentions, it retained preambular paragraph 5, by which the Assembly would express regret over the decision of one State to block a consensus outcome at the tenth NPT Review Conference in August.
By a recorded vote of 122 in favour to 4 against (Nicaragua, Russian Federation, South Africa, Syria), with 28 abstentions, it retained preambular paragraph 6, by which the Assembly would express deep concern at the deteriorated international security environment, including in Ukraine, and that the threat of nuclear weapon use is higher than in the cold war, and note the non-nuclear-weapons States’ concern about qualitative improvement of nuclear forces by some nuclear-weapon States.
Then, by a recorded vote of 145 in favour to 1 against (Israel), with 6 abstentions (Equatorial Guinea, India, Iran, Myanmar, Namibia, Syria), it retained preambular paragraph 10, by which the Assembly would reaffirm its support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.
By a recorded vote of 111 in favour to 6 against (Austria, Egypt, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, South Africa) with 35 abstentions, it decided to retain preambular paragraph 11, by which the Assembly would emphasize the importance for all States of taking further practical steps and effective measures towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, based on the principle of undiminished and increased security for all.
Then, by a recorded vote of 136 in favour to 3 against (China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Russian Federation), with 13 abstentions, it retained preambular paragraph 13, by which the Assembly would reiterate deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and reaffirm that this awareness ought to underpin the approaches and efforts towards nuclear disarmament, and welcome visits of leaders, youth and others to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
By a recorded vote of 138 in favour to 1 against (Russian Federation), with 14 abstentions, it approved preambular paragraph 14, by which the Assembly would acknowledge that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as adopted on 7 July 2021 and entered into force on 22 January 2021.
Then, by a recorded vote of 154 in favour to 2 against (Iran, Russian Federation), with 2 abstentions (Equatorial Guinea, Senegal), it decided to retain preambular paragraph 16, by which the Assembly would reaffirm the importance to ensure equal, full, and effective participation and leadership of both women and men and to further integrate a gender perspective in all aspects of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation decision-making processes.
Turning to operative paragraph 1, the Committee retained it by a recorded vote of 133 in favour to 1 against (Egypt), with 22 abstentions. By its terms, the Assembly would urge all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to ensure nuclear weapons are never used again, pending their total elimination, and to refrain from any inflammatory rhetoric concerning their use.
By a recorded vote of 103 in favour to 15 against, with 39 abstentions, it retained preambular paragraph 2, by which the Assembly would call upon the nuclear-weapon States to honour and respect existing security assurances and to not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT.
By a recorded vote of 143 in favour to 2 against (China, Russian Federation), with 11 abstentions, it decided to retain operative paragraph 3, by which the Assembly would call upon States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency in relation to their NPT obligations and to pursue enhanced transparency measures without prejudice to their national security.
Then, by a recorded vote of 127 in favour to none against, with 30 abstentions, it retained preambular paragraph 4, by which the Assembly would emphasize that maintaining the overall decreasing trend of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons is vital in getting closer to a world free of nuclear weapons and would call upon nuclear-weapon States to undertake further efforts to reduce and eliminate all types of nuclear weapons.
By a recorded vote of 151 in favour to 2 against (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, India), with 6 abstentions (Bhutan, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia), it approved operative paragraph 5, by which the Assembly would urge all States to sign and ratify the CTBT and, pending its entry into force, refrain from nuclear weapon-test explosions and from any other action that would defeat the Treaty’s purpose and to declare a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions.
By a recorded vote of 135 in favour to 4 against (China, Iran, Pakistan, Russian Federation), with 15 abstentions, it retained operative paragraph 6, by which the Assembly would call on the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material as well as on the nuclear-weapon States to declare moratoriums.
By a recorded vote of 136 in favour to 2 against (South Africa, Jamaica), with 21 abstentions, it retained the operative paragraph 7, by which the Assembly would call on States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to commit to effective risk reduction measures to mitigate risks arising from miscalculation or miscommunication, and to maintain the practice of not targeting any other State with nuclear weapons and to keep them at the lowest possible alert level.
Then, by a recorded vote of 129 in favour to 2 against (Iran, South Africa), with 26 abstentions, it kept preambular paragraph 9, by which the Assembly would underscore the importance of complying with the non-proliferation obligations to uphold the NPT’s integrity and the authority of the safeguards system.
Finally, by a recorded vote of 132 in favour to 4 against (China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Syria), with 22 abstentions, the Committee approved the operative paragraph 10, by which the Assembly would reaffirm the commitment to achieve complete dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and programmes, as well as other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes, of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and note with serious concern that country’s new law lowering the threshold for nuclear-weapon use, and urge it to comply with the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
The Committee then approved the draft resolution “L.61” as a whole by a recorded vote of 139 in favour to 6 against (China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, South Africa, Syria), with 31 abstentions.
Next, the Committee took up a draft decision, entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” (document A/C.1/77/L.65), introduced by Egypt on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition. According to the text, the Assembly would include on the agenda of its next session a sub-item of the same name under its item General and Complete Disarmament. The text was approved by a recorded vote of 154 in favour to 3 against (India, Israel, Russian Federation), with 23 abstentions.
The Committee then took up draft decision “Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas” (document A/C.1/77/L.72), introduced by Brazil, by which the Assembly would include on its next agenda a sub-item of the same name. The Committee approved that text by a recorded vote of 160 in favour to 1 against (Russian Federation), with 18 abstentions.
The representative of Costa Rica, on a point of order, reiterated the point made last Friday regarding the importance of having translation in all United Nations official languages while a meeting is in session.
Explanations of Votes
The representative of the Philippines said that nuclear weapons pose an existential threat despite efforts to build norms and legal rules to prohibit them. The Philippines sponsored draft resolution “L.17” on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. She supported “L.45/Rev.1” on the eleventh NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee, as well as “L.61” on steps to build a common road map towards a world without nuclear weapons. Implementation of all nuclear disarmament commitments is urgent and should not be contingent upon subjective assessments of the state of the global security environment. The Philippines has been constrained to abstain on preambular paragraph 11 and vote against operative paragraph 2. The language on undiminished security in preambular paragraph 11 evokes a sense of conditionality on nuclear disarmament, which is a legal obligation of nuclear-weapon States that should not be contingent on their subjective assessment of the security environment.
The representative of Austria, explaining his vote on “L.61”, said he supported the text overall due to its improvements, but could not support a number of paragraphs. He would have agreed to the adoption of the draft final document at the tenth NPT Review Conference settings to avoid a second failed Conference after 2015, but he was not at all satisfied with “L.61”, especially as it related to the NPT’s pillar one. This cornerstone treaty is under immense pressure, including due to the lack of progress on the disarmament pillar, which was evident during the Review Conference. This thinking guided his abstention on preambular paragraph 5. The Japanese resolution unfortunately changed some elements from the Review Conference’s draft outcome document that would have presented some much needed progress, especially on the more detailed compromise on humanitarian consequences and risk of nuclear weapons.
He also was concerned that the language of undiminished security in preambular paragraph 11 was intentionally changed compared to the NPT draft outcome text. The new evidence gained on humanitarian consequences and risks of nuclear weapons underscores the urgency of progress to safeguard the security of all States, and that nuclear disarmament results in the improved security for everyone, including populations of possessor States and non-nuclear-weapon States. Security is indeed not only undiminished but improved by concrete progress in nuclear disarmament and consequently more urgent than ever. The resolution implies that nuclear disarmament has continued consistently through a trend of decreasing numbers, which does not correspond to reality, which is why he abstained on operative paragraph 4.
The representative of Ghana, explaining his vote on “L.61”, said the text appears to be an attempt to consider alternative and practical ways to advance efforts towards complete nuclear disarmament. Ghana maintains that a balanced implementation of the NPT’s three pillars, namely nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, in the entirety represents an indispensable pathway towards a world without nuclear weapons and sustainable development. He supports “L.61” as a whole because he agrees on the need to consider more pragmatic approaches that could engender support for protracted efforts to attain a world without nuclear weapons.
The representative of the Czech Republic, speaking on behalf of the European Union on “L.1” concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, reaffirmed the Union’s full support for such a zone free of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons and their delivery systems as agreed by the NPT States parties. The process must be inclusive for it to be effective. Proposals that force the issue risk failure. The Union has consistently presented this position at the United Nations and reconfirms its readiness to assist the process. It has facilitated dialogue among States of the region and continues to call on all States there that have not yet done so to accede to and abide by the NPT, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, and the CTBT, and to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Additional Protocol, and, where applicable, its modified small quantities protocol, and to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct on ballistic missile proliferation, which could contribute to regional confidence building.
The representative of the Netherlands, explaining his vote on “L.7”, said that everyone shared the long-term goal of this resolution, achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons. He regretted, however, that some of his proposals were not captured in the resolution, specifically on the high-level meetings of the past years. Nor did this year’s proposal address some of his other concerns. The NPT sets the framework for achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free world. However, resolution “L.7” fails to acknowledge its central role and its review cycle. The NPT States parties have confirmed by consensus that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use. That is why he welcomes the call in the resolution to negotiate effective disarmament measures. Generally, however, his concerns have not been acknowledged in the resolution.
The representative of New Zealand, explaining her vote on “L.61”, said she voted in its favour as a good-faith effort to draw the international community together at this critical time on the importance of pursuing a world without nuclear weapons. She regretted, however, that it still suggests a hierarchy, for example, suggesting that the NPT is a cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. This not only betrays the grand bargain at the heart of the NPT and undermines a careful balance between its pillars, but also ignores the existence of other treaties that pursue nuclear disarmament. She, therefore, abstained on preambular paragraphs 3 and 5.
New Zealand welcomes the honest assessment of the international security environment in preambular paragraph 6 and has voted in favour of the text. It abstained on preambular paragraph 11, given that ever expanding use of the caveat that disarmament measures must be pursued in a way that promotes international stability, peace, and security, and based on the principle of undiminished and increased security for all, since the first very confined use of this concept in the outcome of the first special session on disarmament. It was expanded in the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference to apply to significant steps taken by all the nuclear-weapon States.
New Zealand voted in favour of preambular paragraph 13, because of its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, she said. New Zealand welcomes the factual reference to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and preambular paragraph 14 and sees its inclusion as a genuine effort to build consensus on nuclear disarmament. Turning to operative paragraph 1 of the resolution, New Zealand would have preferred much stronger language on ensuring that nuclear weapons are never used again under any circumstance, but welcomes the effort to highlight the connection between their use and the dangers of inflammatory rhetoric, and, therefore, has voted in favour of that provision. New Zealand abstained on preambular paragraph 2, to make clear that it sees considerable room for improvement in the security assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States. On operative paragraph 4, she notes that the reference to maintaining the overall decreasing trend of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons lies in the evidence suggesting that stockpiles are on the brink of increasing. Stockpiles must continue to decrease in order to get closer to zero. Thus, New Zealand voted in favour of this paragraph. New Zealand also voted in support of operative paragraph 9.
The representative of Brazil, also explaining his position on “L.61”, said he wholeheartedly shares Japan’s overarching goal of a world without nuclear weapons and welcomes that some aspects of the draft were an improvement over last year’s text. The large number of requests for votes on several paragraphs illustrate the difficulties of capturing consensus on any single aspect of the multifaceted nuclear disarmament agenda. The resolution fails to achieve the delicate balance of mutual concessions. For these reasons, Brazil abstained on specific provisions, including preambular paragraph 3 and operative paragraph 4, of the view that the text runs counter to the facts as the decreasing trend of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons has been reversed in the last few years. It abstained on operative paragraph 9.
The representative of Algeria, explained on “L.61” that it requires further improvement both in approach and substance. On the approach, he believed that building a common road map towards a world without nuclear weapons should encompass all existing approaches aimed at achieving that goal. In particular, the comprehensive and humanitarian approaches, both of which are supported by the overwhelming majority of States, will be a step in the right direction if taken into consideration during informal consultations by Japan. On the substantive elements, ensuring the balance of the text by keeping the focus on nuclear disarmament measures is extremely important. In this respect, building on the agreed language in a balanced and comprehensive manner could have been more appropriate. Also, avoiding language which gives the impression that nuclear disarmament is subjected to conditionalities is particularly important. In fact, establishing conditionality in this regard goes against the obligations, commitments, and the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.
Further, he said avoiding controversial and politicized language would have been more constructive towards building this road map. Bearing in mind the technical nature of nuclear disarmament, he would have preferred to see this resolution focus, not only on the technical aspects, but also on the non-controversial elements likely to bring different points of views together.
The representative of Pakistan explained his vote on several draft resolutions in the nuclear weapons cluster. On “L.2”, on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, even as he supported many elements of the text, he was obliged to vote against preambular paragraphs 5 and 6, owing to uncalled-for references to the NPT. Pakistan’s position with respect to that Treaty and its review process remains unchanged: the Treaty remains inherently discriminatory. Pakistan, therefore, will neither be a party to it, nor is bound by any of the conclusions and recommendations emanating from its Review Conferences. Pakistan’s nuclear capability was demonstrated after the induction of nuclear weapons in South Asia by a neighbour. On “L.7”, on the follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, he said that since a vote was been called on preambular paragraph 12, he abstained. Due to its reference to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, he was similarly obliged to vote against “L.17” on the Treaty, itself. With regard to “L.42”, entitled “Nuclear Disarmament”, he abstained. On “L.61”, he was obliged to abstain on the resolution as a whole while voting against preambular paragraph 3 and operative paragraph 6, as well as abstaining on preambular paragraphs 5, 6, 13, and 14, as well as on operative paragraph 9.
The representative of Israel, on “L.17” and on “L.52”, on the CTBT, explained that he did not participate in the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and voted “no” on “L.17” and previous resolutions in the Committee and General Assembly on the Treaty. Israel’s deep reservations regarding that instrument are based on substantive as well as procedural considerations. Israel is concerned by arms control and disarmament processes, which fail to give due regard to the security and stability context. Israel also firmly believes that negotiations on such a treaty should have been undertaken in the appropriate forum under the appropriate rules of procedure, which would avoid undermining inclusiveness. The Treaty’s entry into force is relevant only to those countries who signed or ratified it. Hence, Israel is not obliged by it in any way.
He voted in favour of resolution “L.52” in light of Israel’s long-standing support for the CTBT Organization and Treaty, which it signed in 1996. He was unable to support the language contained in “L.52” in its entirety, in particular, preambular paragraph 7 and operative paragraphs 1 and 6. Preambular paragraph 7 includes a reference from another treaty, the NPT, and it’s Review Conference, which is extraneous to the subject of “L.52”. With regard to operative paragraphs 1 and 6, a compilation of the verification regimes is the prerequisite for the Treaty’s entry into force in accordance with the Treaty’s text. It also constitutes a major consideration for ratification for Israel. He acknowledges at the same time the significant progress that has been made in the development of the Treaty’s verification regime.
The representative of Mexico, explaining his vote on “L.61”, said he is convinced of the need to seek a road map towards a world free of nuclear weapons and to maintain peace through effective multilateralism and the pre-eminence of international law. For all of these reasons, he decided to vote in favour of the draft resolution. More consultations and open discussions would have made it possible to narrow the divide on the text. He called on Japan to undertake more consultations as soon as possible ahead of the next session. At the same time, he reiterated his concern that the resolution focuses too much on risk reduction mechanisms. It conditions compliance by States that have nuclear weapons. Additionally, the text and a number of points are subject to reinterpretation, which it weakens or even reverses what is included in other resolutions or even commitments made by the NPT States parties, specifically regarding the Treaty’s article VI, and other actions for which the nuclear weapon-possessor States have special responsibility in particular.
The representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea explained his vote against “L.52”, saying as it is politically motivated to demonize his country and bring pressure to bear upon it. As explicitly stated on a number of occasions, the Korean Peninsula is yet to get out of the vicious cycle of an aggravating situation due to the persistent hostile policy of the United States featuring joint military exercises and nuclear threats. In past years, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea made sustained efforts to implement numerous proposals for confidence building and disarmament to defuse the acute security crisis and to ensure lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. However, the United States responded with a vicious hostile policy, nuclear threats, and blackmail against his country by conducting uninterrupted joint military exercises in and around the Peninsula and introducing strategic assets and cutting-edge military hardware into “South Korea”. The stark reality is that the United States is the main threat undermining the peace and security in the Korean Peninsula and the rest of the region. The key to reversing it is a complete, verifiable, reversible withdrawal of the hostile policy and nuclear blackmail of the United States.
The representative of Singapore said she has a clear and consistent position on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Her abstention on “L.17” is in line with this position. Singapore is committed to the goal of realizing a world free of nuclear weapons and will continue to support resolutions and initiatives that contribute to concrete and meaningful progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. However, her concerns are not fully addressed in the Treaty. The Treaty should not in any way affect the right and obligations of States parties under other instruments, including the NPT, the CTBT, and others, including those establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. There are multiple pathways to a nuclear-weapon-free world, and all relevant parties must work together to achieve meaningful progress.
The representative of Equatorial Guinea explained that she abstained on “L.61” and requested that the Secretariat note that in the record. She supported the spirit of the resolution in previous years and believed those versions were preferable to the current one. She added that not understanding a language is not a handicap or disability, and should not be considered as such, and asked for an apology.
The representative of Iran said he abstained in voting on “L.61”, as well as on preambular paragraphs 3, 5, and 6, and on operative paragraphs 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10. The latest draft final document at the tenth NPT Review Conference, which was presented for adoption, fell short as it did not reflect the views and concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States. A certain preambular provision creates conditionality with regard to the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy, which is not acceptable. He voted against preambular paragraph 16, as it introduces controversial language on gender. The operative paragraph 2 creates conditionality with regard to negative security assurances, which also is not acceptable. The operative paragraph 5 fails to highlight the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States in signing and ratifying the CTBT. The draft has failed to strike an acceptable balance between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. There’s no reference to the urgent need for the nuclear-weapon States to fully and effectively implement their nuclear disarmament obligations.
He said he voted in favour of “L.65”. It recognizes the grave danger to humanity posed by nuclear weapons and calls for their total elimination as the only guarantee against their use or threat of use. It also, among other things, calls for legally binding negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. He abstained on draft decision “L.26” because it takes a selective approach to nuclear disarmament verification and is based on political considerations rather than clear and agreed criteria. Lastly, Iran voted in favour of “L.17”. The adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was a step in the right direction. It complements the NPT. The Treaty, itself, however, should also be complemented with the urgent commencement of negotiations and conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons leading to the total elimination of those weapons in a verifiable and irreversible manner.
The representative of Switzerland made a number of brief explanations of votes regarding several resolutions under the nuclear cluster. Regarding “L.2” on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, he voted “yes”. On “L.7” on the follow up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, he abstained. On “L.61”, he appreciates Japan’s effort to find common ground in the wake of the tenth NPT Review Conference and he voted in favour of the resolution as a whole, but could not vote “yes” on all paragraphs.
The representative of the Republic of Korea, concerning “L.61”, said the draft captured the discussion during the tenth NPT Review Conference in a balanced and appropriate manner. It also reflects the current security environment and identifies practical and concrete steps forward. He also supports the strong call for the denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. He voted in favour of the resolution as a whole. However, he strongly believes that the term used to refer to the atomic bomb survivors should have been phrased in a more general and appropriate manner so that it fully takes into account the entirety of a survivor’s experience regardless of nationality.
The representative of India, on “L.17”, said she did not participate in the negotiations on the Treaty and, therefore, will not become a party to it or be bound by any obligations that may arise from it. On “L.42”, she shared the main objective of the draft resolution, which is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe. However, she abstained because of certain references to the NPT, the CTBT, as well as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, on which India’s position is well known. On “L.46”, on ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world, India agrees with several provisions, in particular, its acknowledgement that nuclear disarmament is a global public good of the highest order. She supports the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on nuclear disarmament, and in that regard, supports the Non-Aligned Movement’s proposal for the commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention. On “L.61”, India acknowledges that Japan is the only country to have suffered a nuclear weapons attack. She voted against operative paragraph 5 on the CTBT. India’s views on the NPT are well known, and the resolution includes several references to that Treaty, which are not applicable to India since it is not a State party.
The representative of the Russian Federation on “L.26” said that oversight and verifications procedures cannot be taken separately from specific treaties in arms reduction and limitation. The development of verification measures and procedures must take into consideration a whole host of operational and technical issues linked to the design of nuclear weapons and the special features linked to their deployment and operation. In most cases, this is extremely sensitive information from a non-proliferation standpoint, which cannot be transferred to third parties. He believes that the idea of setting up a group of scientific and technical experts working on nuclear disarmament verification has no added value and doubts that the international community needs to spend time and resources on this activity. He supported “L.26” on the work of a group of governmental experts on nuclear disarmament verification, which is of a technical nature. He believes that the group, in which the Russian Federation participates, should operate on the basis of its mandate.
The representative of Indonesia, explaining her vote on “L.61”, said the resolution as a whole fails to meet expectations for ambitious, comprehensive and targeted actions towards a world without nuclear weapons. Instead of covering all relevant aspects of nuclear disarmament, the text only touches upon issues in a discriminatory manner. It does not reflect on or reaffirm the need to implement existing commitments agreed at relevant conferences. Efforts remain elusive regarding genuine commitments from all nuclear-weapon States towards nuclear disarmament. In fact, nuclear disarmament is an enabler of security and stability, and not the other way around. Thus, she is not in favour of preambular paragraph 11. Indonesia abstained on the resolution as a whole.
The representative of the United States, explaining his abstention on “L.1” on establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, said his country has long supported the goal of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The United States will continue to invest significant resources, financial, diplomatic, and otherwise, in building regional capacity to address weapons of mass destruction-related risks in supporting the important institutions that undergird the non-proliferation regime, and in promoting regional dialogue to build confidence and address proliferation challenges, including non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations and commitments. The United States is not in a position to vote in favour of this resolution at present, given the significant diversions of views among regional States regarding how to advance this important goal. He remains closely engaged with all regional parties and stands ready to actively support any initiatives to advance implementation of the 1995 resolution. The United States hopes that someday it will be possible for that resolution to be adopted by consensus and for all the regional States to participate in direct, inclusive and meaningful discussions with their neighbours about their regional security concerns and how to advance the shared goal of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction.
The representative of Spain, explaining his position on “L.30” on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, said Spain has always shown its unequivocal support to the Treaty, and is delighted that it has entered into force. He wishes to highlight that the Treaty of Pelindaba does not contain any provisions, obligations, guarantees, or safeguards in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. He also added that the whole territory of Spain has been militarily denuclearized as of 1976.
The representative of Argentina, explaining his vote on several drafts in the nuclear weapons cluster, said Argentina abstained on “L.17”. It has shown great commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction through its continued support for the NPT as well as regional agreements like the Treaty of Tlatelolco. However, Argentina’s analysis and review of the impact of the non-proliferation regime, the NPT, the CTBT, and peaceful use of nuclear energy, has not been completed.
On “L.61”, preambular paragraph 5, he said that Argentina had hoped for a successful tenth NPT Review Conference and a consensus document. Since that was not possible, efforts should focus now on strengthening the NPT and working towards the new review cycle.
On operative paragraph 2 of “L.61”, he said that while, as a whole, it reflected important commitments like negative security guarantees, the implications of national statements by nuclear-weapon States on the Tlatelolco Treaty and its Protocols meant that his country could not support this paragraph. He called on nuclear-weapon States that made interpretative declarations to the Treaty’s Protocols to withdraw them.
The representative of Ireland, explaining his position on “L.61”, said he regretted the decision by an NPT State party to block adoption of the final outcome document at the last Review Conference. At the same time, he did not consider that either the “undelivered” outcome or this resolution was a basis for work in the next NPT review cycle. He regretted that this resolution seeks to characterize undiminished security as a recognized principle, which it is not, and notes that the reference has been taken out of context. Ireland is further concerned that the resolution appears to place conditionality on security assurances. Ireland is pleased that the text supports the equal, full and effective participation and leadership of both women and men and a gender perspective in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation decision-making.
The representative of Kazakhstan, on “L.61” said that Japan’s resolution this year was tabled amid unusually complicated circumstances, following a lengthy debate at the tenth NPT Review Conference that did not produce consensus. In this context, Japan endeavours to breach existing gaps, which is commendable. However, the substance of the resolution lacks concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament. This resolution refers to the NPT as the main driver for nuclear disarmament. The text would carry more weight if nuclear disarmament proposals were more prominently featured in it. The resolution should call for great efforts to be made to raise awareness about the realities and the impact of nuclear weapons testing, as well as the weak assistance and environmental remediation. He was equally surprised to see no references to nuclear-weapon-free zones. This key element of the global disarmament architecture has proven itself and should be expanded to other geographical regions, where applicable. Kazakhstan could not vote in favour of “L.61” overall and decided to abstain.
The representative of Japan, explaining his votes on “L.16” on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, and “L.17”, said Japan voted in favour of “L.16”. As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, Japan fully shares the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the humanitarian consequences of their use based on first-hand experience. Japan voted against the “L.17”. It is an important Treaty, which could be regarded as a final passage to a world without nuclear weapons. However, engagement with nuclear-weapon States remains necessary in order to change the current reality. He deeply regrets that the latest NPT Review Conference could not adopt a consensus outcome document. The draft final document may provide a useful basis for the international community to advance realistic discussions on nuclear disarmament.
The representative of Colombia explained that her country has a strong commitment towards disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. The existence of nuclear weapons and the delay in their complete elimination jeopardizes civilization and its basic principles. The presumption that nuclear weapons, defensive and deterrent systems actually provide security is false. There is no justification for the use of nuclear weapons, or for the threat of their use. No resolution of the General Assembly has the status or the legal force to change the provisions of binding instruments. For this reason, “L.61” cannot be applied to the detriment of the legal obligations established in the NPT or the commitments agreed at its review conferences. The ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and the legal obligation for complete and general disarmament subjected to strict and effective international control will admit no conditionality in any way that undermines collective security. To the contrary, the ultimate goal is a guarantee of security for all. It is precisely nuclear weapons that undermine collective security and endanger humanity’s very survival. Colombia supports this resolution as a whole, however, it voted against operative paragraph 2 and abstained on preambular paragraphs 3 and 11, and operative paragraph 9.
The representative of Djibouti underscored the importance of maintaining multilateralism and reiterated her commitment to multilingualism. Under no circumstances should financial issues undermine multilingualism, and she asked that her statement be included in the record of this meeting.
The representative of France, explaining her vote on “L.7”, said that calling for a high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament does not address vital threats such as thwarting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and combating the deterioration in the overall international security environment, which are crucial for creating enabling conditions for further progress on nuclear disarmament. The NPT is the necessary framework for nuclear disarmament. Convening another conference to discuss nuclear disarmament without due regard for the NPT as a whole will not allow headway. She cannot support the resolution. On the decisions “L.65” on accelerated implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments and “L.72” on a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere, France will not oppose consensus which calls for these items to be added to the agenda of the next General Assembly session. Nonetheless, she is opposed to the substance therein. Regarding “L.16” on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, as well as “L.46” on ethical imperatives, more than 50 years since the NPT’s adoption, it remains one of the most universally supported treaties. It continues to extend benefits on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and provides a framework for substantive disarmament. It has helped to stall the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Its preamble sets forth the consequences and concerns associated with the use of those weapons. Some who continue to promote the humanitarian consequences narrative contend that nuclear disarmament can be achieved by prohibiting the possession and use of nuclear weapons. She added that France uses French and would like to associate itself with the statements delivered by several delegations calling for full respect of Article 51 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.
The representative of Egypt on “L.61” said he had to abstain on the resolution as a whole, as well as on many of its paragraphs, in addition to voting against three paragraphs. The resolution undermines nuclear disarmament obligations, relevant previously agreed commitments, as well as the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States. It also implicitly links the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations to preconditions related to developments in global security by calling on all States to undertake further steps and effective measures towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, some paragraphs weaken the language of previously agreed commitments under the NPT and its review conference in a manner that reinforces an alarming trend. He commends Japan for adding preambular paragraph 10 on the establishment of a Middle East Zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction, however, he agrees that the language was added only in the second version of the resolution and did not include a reference to the Conference on the establishment of such a zone and the success it had during its two sessions.
The representative of Kiribati welcomed the reference to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in preambular paragraph 14 of “L.61”, which reflected progressive efforts to build a common roadmap. However, he regrets that the proposal removed references to assistance for victims of nuclear testing and the environment. Following assurances by the lead sponsor to incorporate these issues next time, Kiribati abstained but looked forward to consensus being embraced next time. The Pacific community and friends are waiting for “nuclear justice”. It has become even more imperative with many survivors getting older and their families experiencing intergenerational health and environmental impacts. Under the framework of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’ action plan, Kiribati and Kazakhstan will co-chair a working group on victim assistance, environmental remedies and international cooperation and assistance.
Right of Reply
The representative of the Russian Federation, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, rejected the baseless accusations relating to the draft outcome of the tenth NPT Review Conference. He clarified that, over the last few years, the NPT regime has faced gruelling tests. The existing arms control system has broken down, with growing disagreements between Member States over implementation. The international community failing to get an outcome document at the Review Conference last August is further confirmation of this fact. Throughout the work on the draft report, States disagreed on issues related to all the NPT’s three pillars. The Russian Federation took an active part in the spirit of cooperation, and acted openly, honestly and with the utmost respect for other positions.
However, he said, several countries used the Review Conference for political score-settling and showed an inability to take all States parties into consideration. That was why the outcome document was blocked. In fact, the majority of participations were also dissatisfied with the content. Nevertheless, under today’s tough geopolitical circumstances, it was very valuable that the NPT States parties managed to hold an exchange of views on the whole range of issues. Shifting the blame to the Russian Federation only aggravated the situation and was not conducive to a constructive atmosphere. He called on all delegations that levelled those accusations at the Russian Federation to stop and focus on the substantive work to strengthen the NPT regime and the effective implementation of all its provisions.
The representative of Japan, also speaking in exercise of the right of reply, responded to the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. With respect to Japan’s national policies, he said it was regrettable that those countries abused the occasion of the explanation after the vote to express their positions, which were not related to the resolution proposed by Japan. Their allegations were utterly groundless. On the Russian Federation’s statement regarding the reference in “L.61” to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, these examples of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences were included to revitalize international momentum for nuclear disarmament, not to distort the fact of the Second World War.
Regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s allegations about Japanese security policy, he said that under the Japanese Constitution, the country maintained an exclusively defence-oriented policy – it would not become a military Power and would not pose a threat to other countries. The military was under strict civilian control, which ensured transparency of its defence-related expenditure. Japan will not change course as a peace-loving nation. Japan also does not allow nuclear sharing, he said. The Japanese Government also has no intentions to even discuss nuclear sharing.
In response to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s statement, he underlined that all plutonium and highly enriched uranium in Japan were for peaceful use only and under stringent IAEA safeguards. Moreover, Japan does not import any highly enriched uranium and plutonium.
He asked for a correction on the statement about the “ALPS-treated water” from the Fukushima nuclear powerplant, which the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s representative referred to as contaminated water. This is not correct. The ALPS-treated water is discharged only when the Tepco company complies with the regulatory standards of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. If and when the discharge takes place, the water has concentrations far below international standards and is sufficiently purified. Japan’s basic policy is not about contaminating the water, and it would never discharge water into the sea if it does not meet the regulatory standard. The IAEA will also monitor this.
The representative of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea said that Japan outrageously continues to deceive the international community in this forum, given its record-high military expenditure, its continued development of advanced weapons systems, and joint military drills with the United States. Japan has already transformed itself into a “war-capable” country. Japan revised the United States-Japan defence cooperation guiding principles to provide a legal framework to “stretch out its tentacles” to the Korean Peninsula. A part of its defence budget is earmarked for long missile strike capabilities, counter-offensive capabilities, naval hardware and more. It is secretly importing high quantities of uranium and plutonium and tries to discharge nuclear contaminated water. If Japan argues that it is planning to discharge non-nuclear contaminated water, why not hold it for domestic use? The international community should look into the “crafty and two-faced” nature of Japan. Japan is paying lip service to the non-nuclear policy of peace and prosperity.
The representative of Japan, responding, reiterated that his country’s defence policy is exclusively for defensive purposes. Its exclusive defensive nature was expressed in a clear manner. The purpose of Japan’s defence- related expenditure is to protect the lives and livelihood of the Japanese people and to contribute to the peace and security of the international community. In December 2018, Japan formulated national defence programme guidelines that set forth its level of capability of defence in a 10-year timeframe, detailing the total cost over five years and the inventories of key capital equipment. That was all public, thereby making it very transparent. Currently, the Japanese Government is formulating new national programme guidelines for its medium-term defence programme. It will continue to ensure high transparency in defence- related expenditure so those baseless allegations cannot be repeated. On the issue of “ALPS-treated” water, he has already detailed his country’s basic position. He emphasized his country’s complete involvement with international authorities, such as the IAEA, to ensure that all operations are conducted in line with transparency and international standards.
General Statements — Weapons of Mass Destruction
KRZYSZTOF MARIA SZCZERSKI (Poland) introduced the draft resolution, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (document A/C.1/77/L.55). The Convention, he said, remains a unique instrument, freeing the world from the scourge of an entire category of mass destruction weapons. The world must not become complacent. Today, with the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine, the international non-proliferation regime was under threat. The prevention of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, required the international community’s attention. It should send a strong and clear signal in support of the Convention and make all efforts towards its implementation. “L.55” was a great way to do that. Due to the politization of positions on key matters, the text has lost its consensual character, but it was still important, meaningful, and supported by the vast majority. It preserved agreed language and was updated to maintain relevance and reflect new developments, including in relation to the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
CAMILLE PETIT (France), on behalf of the Germany and France, said she supported all of the international conventions in this cluster, including the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, and Geneva Protocol. In that vein, she introduced the co-sponsored biannual draft resolution on Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive sources (document A/C.1/77/L.64). In line with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), the draft recalls the instruments available to combat radioactive sources falling into the hands of terrorists as well as the importance of the IAEA guidelines.
She said that this year, the text includes a series of technical aspects and agreed language. Special attention is drawn to the use of radioactive sources in armed conflict. She underlined that these updates do not change the draft’s substance. She regrets that the international community’s unity has been broken, which is a damaging signal for these instruments’ authority and the IAEA’s role.
KONSTANTIN VORONTSOV (Russian Federation) introduced the draft resolution Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (document A/C.1/77/L.69), which aims to ensure the effective use of the Mechanism as an instrument in the sphere of biological and chemical security. Noting the great demand for international efforts in this field, he explained that the principles and procedures have not been updated since 1990. To a large extent, they were out of lockstep with new developments and new threats and challenges, such as terrorism. The draft proposes that the Secretary-General request Member States’ opinions and proposals on the state of the procedures, to update them if needed, and requests him to submit a substantive report with an annex including Member States’ inputs.
He said that the separate vote on operative paragraph 3 demonstrates that the opponents of this initiative do not have cogent arguments against it. It is a glaring attempt to call the Secretary-General’s mandate into question and leads to a discriminatory practice that has no place at the United Nations. He called on Member States to lend their support to operative paragraph 3 and to “L.69” as a whole. In essence, the delegates voting in favour of the draft on the Mechanism will be giving every State an opportunity to express its opinion, which was the reason the Organization was founded in the first place. He counted on Member States to be decisive and to respect the spirit of the Charter by supporting this resolution.
The representative of Syria, in a point of order, asked whether “L.55” on the Chemical Weapons Convention was indeed closed for co-sponsorship as the Secretariat had informed her delegation.
The Chair replied that the draft resolution was indeed closed at this time for additional co-sponsors.
The representative of Poland added that “L.55” was traditionally closed for co-sponsorship.
The representative of Syria asked whether this meant that co-sponsorship was not possible at the moment of adoption.
The Chair replied that, no, it is not.
Source: United Nations